In 249, Rome lost another entire fleet to a storm. Carthage returned to mastery of the sea. Were there any trees left in Italy to build another fleet and enough plebeians to man it? You would think the Romans had had enough of naval warfare and its meteorological capriciousness. It did need a break. Carthage’s forces on Sicily were at least holding their own and now they did not need to worry about Roman reinforcements being landed by a fleet, since Rome no longer had a fleet. It was also nearly bankrupt, its seafaring communities were exhausted, and its population had actually declined since the beginning of the war. Rome must surely take stock of the situation and evacuate the island. Since this was the logical thing to do, the Carthaginian government saw no reason to reinforce its army on Sicily to kick the Romans while they were down. It was a typically miserly move on the part of the nation of merchants. And it was a bad mistake.
Like a woman after childbirth saying never that pain again, the Romans took a while to forget how painful losing fleets to storms had been. But like that mother, they eventually decided to give it a go again. Seven years after the last disaster, the people of Rome were ready to stake their future expansion on one more fleet. A fleet was necessary to blockade and capture the remaining Carthaginian strongholds of Drepana and Lilybaeum. Plebeians were encouraged to show their patriotism by volunteering as oarsmen and the patricians were peer-pressured to pony up for the new fleet (and promised reimbursement from the war indemnity). It is possible that some rich Romans donated slaves as rowers. It is also possible that once again the Romans called upon its allies to provide the oarsmen. Before you laud the nobles for loaning money for galleys, take some time to pity the allies for having to donate more drowners. With the creation of another fleet, once again Rome showed its resiliency and stubbornness. A fleet of 250 galleys and a large number of transports were built and manned. This was the fifth time the Romans built a large fleet! This one was different. With the removal of the corvi, the galleys had been simply large, poorly mobile vessels. This partly explains the disaster at Drepana. However, for this last fleet, the Romans copied a famous blockade runner captured during the blockade of Lilybaeum. The ship belonged to Hannibal the Rhodian and it was reputed to be the fastest and most seaworthy quinquereme in the Carthaginian navy.
By this time, the Carthaginian government realized that the war of attrition had not led to the pigheaded Romans coming to the peace table. With a resigned collective sigh, they built a fleet, too. It consisted of around 200 quinqueremes. Because it was putting down a rebellion in Africa, the Carthaginians did not have the usual manpower to crew the ships. They had to call upon citizens who normally were not called upon in war. This meant that not only were the oarsmen inexperienced, but they were also unwilling to train hard. Roman proconsul Gaius Lutatius Catulus (this cognomen means “puppy”; sadly, we do not know why he was called that) was able to train his fleet to the best of any Roman fleet in the war. He had started as an elected consul for 242, but the Senate wisely kept him in command by appointing him proconsul. This solved the big problem with lack of continuity in Roman naval command. Giving a consul only one year to get used to naval warfare and tactics was much worse than having a consul as general of an army for one year. Catulus had the time to prepare for the decisive battle. He turned out to be the best admiral Rome was to produce in the war.
In 241, Carthaginian admiral Hanno put to sea with his undermanned ships with inexperienced crews. His plan was to run the blockade to bring supplies to Hamilcar at Eryx and bring aboard his mercenaries to serve as marines in the upcoming showdown. He did not get that far. The Romans blocked his path and the Battle of the Aegates (Polybius called it the Battle of Aegusa) took place on March 10, 241. Despite the rough conditions, Catulus was determined to win the war on this day. It was a risky decision, especially since Rome had lost fleets in similar rough seas. However, Catulus knew that allowing the Carthaginian fleet to reach Eryx would mean he would then face a fleet with Hamilcar’s elite soldiers serving as marines. The fact that his crews were able to row effectively in the rough sea and with the wind in their faces shows how well-trained they were. The evolution of the Roman navy from the start of the war to this battle was astounding. Especially when you realize that after losing at Drepana, this was the first victory for the Romans without the corvus. And the battle was symbolic of where the opposing navies were at the end of the war.
This battle and the battle of Drepana were complete opposites, in terms of the measures each side had taken beforehand, and so, of course, the outcome was the opposite as well. The Romans had altered the design of their ships and had offloaded everything heavy apart from what they would actually need for the battle; their crews were well trained and did an outstanding job, and the marines were, out of the entire army, the men least likely to ever give up. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, had ships too heavy with freight to be battleworthy, their crews had been raised at short notice and had received no training at all, and their marines were new conscripts who had never before been under stress or faced danger. [Polybius]
Catulus laid the groundwork for the victory, but his second in command praetor Quintus Valerius Falto led the fleet in the battle due to the proconsul suffering from a previous wound. Falto advanced the fleet in a choppy sea with the wind in their faces. The battle was hard fought, but the Romans prevailed because of their better training and for the first time their galleys were more maneuverable. They faced Punic warships laden with supplies which made them wallow in the waves. The Carthaginians lost 50 ships sunk, 70 ships captured, along with 10,000 men. Rome lost around 30 quinqueremes sunk. Catulus got a triumph and Falto got a junior triumph. Both sides recognized the battle as decisive. Carthage had no desire to create another fleet and/or strengthen the army to win in Sicily. It agreed to a peace treaty that gave up Sicily and called for an indemnity of an incredibly steep 3,200 talents to be paid over the next ten years.
The end of the First Punic War found Rome with no rival in the western Mediterranean. The land power was now a maritime power. The Roman navy would go on to dominate the Mediterranean for the next 600 years. The Mediterranean became known as “mare nostrum” which means “our sea”. And Carthage had been consigned to the dustbin of history. Or had it?
- from The Scipios in Spain
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